LUCIA TISCORNIA assesses the numerous high-profile cases of corruption and maladministration reaching headlines in recent months, and finds that an inclusive, cohesive society requires transparent and effective public institutions.
Earlier this month, the Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed former police commissioner Jackie Selebi’s appeal to his conviction and sentence of charges of corruption. Even before Selebi presented himself to the department of correctional services, the case had already done much to damage the image of the South African Police Service (SAPS). At the time of his guilty verdict, Judge Meyer Joffe intimated that, by mixing with shady figures, Selebi not only compromised his own reputation, but also that of the institution of the SAPS in the eyes of ordinary South Africans.
In a country where most citizens rate crime as one of the most prohibitive factors to their personal freedom, Selebi’s conviction at the time raised the concern that not even those who have been entrusted to uphold the law can be relied upon to do so in an accountable and transparent manner. If this is what happens in the police, many asked, how rife must it be elsewhere?
In light of Selebi’s conviction, it was expected government would have thought long and hard about an appropriate successor, who could restore faith in the Office of the Commissioner of Police, but also contain and push back the negative spill-over effect it had on the reputation of the SAPS. Bheki Cele became Selebi’s permanent successor, but his leadership has also not escaped controversy, following Public Protector Thuli Madonsela’s damning report on irregular expenditure relating to the procurement of office space for its national headquarters in Pretoria and provincial headquarters in Durban.
As a result, President Zuma’s announcement of Cele’s suspension, pending investigation, as well as the demotions of public works minister, Gwen Mahlangu-Nkabinde and cooperative governance and traditional affairs minister Sicelo Shiceka, have been widely welcomed in recent weeks. Actions like these send out a necessary message that non-transparent governance will not be tolerated and that no one, regardless of social standing, is immune to sanction. These actions have been positive steps towards ensuring greater accountability and transparency in the management of public funds at a time when the South African government is forced to become increasingly vigilant about unwarranted expenditure. In addition, the President’s action also won him vital political capital vis-a-vis those critics who have portrayed him as indecisive and unwilling to take unpopular but necessary action.
In all of this, the name of the public protector, Advocate Thuli Madonsela, has featured prominently. Since she took over from her predecessor, Lawrence Mushwana, Madonsela has infused new life in an institution that some had come to regard as overly cautious in the extent to which it was willing to assert itself in relation to the executive. Unlike Mushwana, who was criticised for his apparent unwillingness to challenge alleged impropriety in higher offices, Madonsela has not shied away when confronted with instances like these.
In her the South African state has a committed public servant who appears to be willing to exercise her constitutional mandate without fear or favour. She has also given new stature to an institution that is critical to the functioning of any democratic state. Yet, institutions alone may not be enough, because they don’t function in isolation from the societies within which they are embedded. If new reports relating to Independent Complaints Directorate’s rental of new offices – incidentally also belonging to Roux Shabangu, implicated in Madonsela’s report – at exorbitant rates are accurate, it underscores the fact that maladministration cannot be addressed through institutions alone, regardless of how functional they are.
If we are to regard corruption only as a consequence of maladministration, answers to its eradication could simply be sought in administrative reforms to make managerial practices more watertight. Yet, its scale and pervasiveness suggests that, although important, an over-reliance on management change alone is likely to treat the symptoms, but not the causes. If, however, we broaden enquiry into the social relationships that facilitate it, we are more likely to reach viable and sustainable solutions to the problem. Such an approach is particularly necessary in South Africa with its exceptionally high levels of social inequality, manifested not only in income-level disparities, but also in access to services and ability to exercise basic rights.
Because public institutions exercise a democratic mandate, it is perfectly reasonable of citizens to demand ‘good’ institutions that are functional and able to deliver. Yet, whether institutions are ‘good’ or ‘bad’ cannot be separated from the context where they operate. This context is shaped by socioeconomic circumstances, but also a political culture that becomes entrenched over time. Perceptions of legitimacy emanate from that context, and over time may also adapt to the relevant circumstances.
As such, it is inevitable that adherence to – and administration of – legislation will over time become a function of what is acceptable and possible practice within a given context. This has relevance for the present; at this early stage in South Africa’s democratic development, it is worth remembering that repeated practices – good or bad – will ultimately over time become entrenched patterns.
The current configuration of the country’s socioeconomic sphere makes it in some ways more susceptible to the validation of practices that distort the impersonal nature of state bureaucracy. Its highly monopolised and unequal nature excludes many, hence the state can become an obvious source of recourse for those who feel that their marginalisation puts them at a disadvantage. If unchecked, such behaviour can become entrenched as illegal, but conveniently overlooked, modes of transacting amongst an exclusive, connected, and class-(as opposed to race-) based elite.
If anything, such a scenario should be a convincing argument to those that are still reticent towards affirmative measures that prioritise a more equitable and inclusive society. These policies, if implemented in the spirit within which they have been conceptualised, will not only be to the benefit of those that have been marginalised in the past, but to all citizens who seek to prosper in an environment that creates more opportunity and less dependence.
Indeed, corruption speaks of a management problem and it is a crime. The commitment of the public protector and President Zuma’s firm response to her report must be commended. The positive movement after many years on the arms deal saga is also a significant development, since many have regarded this as an issue that has profoundly shaped conduct within our body politic. But ultimately, corruption – and most forms of maladministration – emerges from oppressive conditions that undermine opportunity, whether in the form of employment, education, or access to development finance. It does not excuse malpractice, but it needs to be understood in the context that breeds it.
Any government that claims to be working towards building a more inclusive society should therefore also view and treat the issue of corruption as symptomatic of processes of exclusion. And all those outside of government – civil society organisations and ordinary citizens – who are concerned with its impact, may, in addition to their emphasis on proper oversight, also consider how they will contribute and cooperate in this regard. Institutions may serve to hold back the tide, but they may not necessarily change long-term behaviour if material conditions are not amenable to it.
Lucía Tiscornia is a visiting research intern at the IJR from the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at Notre Dame University in the United States.